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THE SETTLEMENT OF
LABOR DISPUTES IN INDUSTRIES
AFFECTED WITH
A NATIONAL INTEREST
JAMES J. GRAHAM*

W

HAT TO DO after

the eighty-day "cooling-off" period? Congress left

this question unanswered when it added emergency dispute provisions to the National Labor Relations Act in 1947,1 and since then
much of the debate about the legislation has focused on this aspect of the
problem of satisfying the public needs during labor disputes in industries
affected with a national interest. However, in the opinion of this observer,
a more accurate or complete description of the problem should also make
reference to the prevention of emergency disputes ab initio by removing
the underlying causes of such conflicts.
The legislation has not been amended since its enactment, but periodic
labor disturbances, such as the recent resumption of the Atlantic-Gulf
Coast longshoremen's strike following the expiration of the injunction
procured at the behest of President Kennedy, dramatically illustrate the
problem and, at the same time, tend to provoke re-appraisals of the efficacy of the current legislation.
Surprisingly enough, in an area as volatile and charged with partisan
and political considerations as labor-management relations there is a fair
amount of agreement among both neutrals and participants on basic
* A.B., Fordham University; LL.B., St. John's University; LL.M., New York Uni-

versity.
I National Emergency Provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
155, 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§176-180 (1958).
The statute permits the President to appoint a board to inquire into the issues involved in a labor dispute which, in his opinion, may "imperil the national health or
safety." Upon receiving the board's report, the President may direct the Attorney
General to petition an appropriate United States district court for an injunction
restraining the work stoppage. The injunction granted by the court may last eighty
days at most, after which period the work stoppage may recommence.
The Act also requires the National Labor Relations Board to poll the affected employees during the fifteen days prior to the expiration of the injunction, to determine
if the "final offer of settlement made by their employer" is acceptable to them.
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principles to be applied to emergency dispute legislation. These principles may be
summarized roughly as follows:
1. The American system of collective
bargaining for the most part has succeeded
in maintaining industrial peace; hence,
2. The federal government should intervene actively in labor disputes only in those
rare instances when the national health and
safety is truly endangered.
3. On such occasions, the enabling legislation should permit the President some
flexibility in his choice of procedures to be
employed.
4. Greater emphasis should be placed on
the resolution of disputed matters on a continuing basis during the term of the collective bargaining agreement; and finally,
5. Congress should permit the states to
assert jurisdiction over those labor disputes
presently subject to federal pre-emption,
the impact of which, however, is primarily
local.
In the light of these principles the
proposed amendment to the NLRA that
deserves most serious consideration is contained in a report entitled Free and Responsible Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace2 submitted to the Executive
Branch on May 1, 1962 by the President's
Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy.The Committee's report affirms
that collective bargaining, when responsive
to the public, or common interest, is an essential element of economic democracy.
However, "the growing complexities of our
own industrial society and the instabilities
of the international setting now require that
the parties recognize not only their own individual responsibilities but their joint
responsibility to the society of which they
250 L.R.R.M. 11 (1962).

CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN

1963

constitute an important and integral part.
This calls for improved private and public
procedures and techniques, and above all,
for an increased measure of maturity ... "
Accordingly, the report places great
stress on measures which, though voluntary,
seem designed to encourage greater acceptance of the concept that the public has a
real interest in major negotiations. For
example, negotiators should employ the
services of third parties for mediation, recommendations, or for the arbitration of
disputed items. Labor and management
should experiment more freely with techniques of fact-finding by jointly-appointed
experts or by personnel drawn from their
own staffs. The report urges negotiators to
exchange freely data necessary for intelligent negotiations and to make joint requests
for such information to the appropriate government agencies such as the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor.
The President's Advisory Committee also
noted its approval of a proposed plan by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
to make greater use of panels of mediators,
to raise the professional status of its personnel and, the parties willing, to participate at an earlier stage in the more difficult
and important negotiations.
Industry Councils
With an apparent view towards assuring
a national perspective among labor and
management leaders, the Committee also
proposed that periodic conferences be held
under government auspices, addressed to
national and international influences affecting economic problems.
Here, the report may be criticized justly
for not going far enough. Even if the Committee contemplates separate labor-manage-
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ment-government conferences for each
industry, discussions concerning the cold
war, unemployment statistics or foreign
trade may develop a greater concern for the
national interest among union and corporate officials but this will not necessarily reduce the number of major work stoppages.
A supplemental statement by Judge Joseph
E. O'Grady, a member of the Board of Public Accountability 3 appointed to inquire into
the recent shutdown of the New York City
newspapers, agreed that parties to a labor
dispute may have moral obligations to the
public and should take the public interest
into consideration before deciding upon a
course of action which might have a serious
impact upon the public. However, Judge
O'Grady also stated that, "it does not necessarily follow that these obligations...
always outweigh in the mind of a union
leader his obligations in a given situation to
his members. The same applies to an employer's obligations to himself or his stockholders . . .-

The temptation to favor self-interest presumably will be more acute the further removed union and management officials are
from participation in the conferences contemplated by the President's Committee,
and, hence, more subject to local pressures.
For example, the same issue of the magazine
that published Judge O'Grady's remarks
also carried a feature on the "push button"
newspaper of the future. The Los Angeles
Times now has in operation automated
printing devices which will utimately reduce
that newspaper's present complement of

one-hundred and ten linotype and teletypesetter operators by at least fifty per cent.5
The answer then lies in periodic labormanagement conferences, preferably with
some government participation, on all
practicable levels - industry-wide, regional,
and/or on the plant level - designed to
resolve the precipitating causes of work
stoppages. The late Philip Murray, first
president of the merged AFL-CIO, proposed a so-called Industry Council Plan
during the Second World War for each defense industry, which would have provided
for tripartite cooperation and periodic
meetings for the avowed purpose of increasing production, -plant efficiency and of promoting industrial harmony. Walter Reuther
in 1941 proposed a similar plan for the aircraft industry. The CIO endorsed Murray's
ICP but, for the most part, such overtures
were greeted with apathy even in union
circles.6 Philip Murray reportedly complained at that time that the conservatives
said his plan was communistic and the Communists said it was papal.
Though Murray's concepts of social justice admittedly owed much to the influence
of the papal encyclicals, his Industry Council Plan actually was timorous compared
with the "syndicalist" reform proposed by
7
Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno.

Pope Pius envisioned associations of employer and union representatives in the
various industries which would function as
quasi-official agencies of the government in
all matters of common interest." In addition,
commencing with the chairmanship in the

3The other members were Judges Harold R. Me-

dina and David W. Peck. Their report charged that
the printers' strike was not a "move of last resort"

but rather "a deliberate design formed by the printers' representatives as the opening gambit in negotiations." Editor and Publisher, Jan. 19, 1963, p. 58.
4 Id. at 59.

SId. at 15.
OSee Commonweal, Sept. 2, 1960; Commonweal,
Aug. 14, 1942.
7 Pius XI, Quadragesirno Anno (1931), FivE
ENCYCLICALS

125 (1939).

s Id. at 150-51.
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1930's of the late Father John A. Ryan,
the Department of Social Action of the
National Catholic Welfare Conference
perennially proposes for America modified
versions of the formula of Pope Pius XI.9
The controlling principle, of course, is that
since human society constitutes a truly
social and organic body "the various forms
of human endeavor, dependent one upon
the other," must be "united in mutual harmony and mutual support... ."", The complex interconnection among the various
sectors of the economy, the obvious interrelationship between wages and prices, production and employment, profits and tax
revenues, militate against the archaic notion
that parties to collective bargaining negotiations can, or should be permitted to, conduct their business in "splendid" isolation.
Ironically, in his own industry, steel,
Murray's proposal won partial acceptance
in the formation of a Human Relations
Committee as a result of the bitter and
costly steel strike of 1959-60. The steel
committee seeks to settle all labor-management quarrels during the term of the contract, free from the emotionally-charged
atmosphere of negotiating sessions. In addition, the recent settlement of emergency
dispute strikes in the airlines and longshore
industries generally have provided for interim conferences to avoid future crisis."
George Meaney has stated that his union, a
New York City plumbers' local, has had
only two strikes and one lockout during the
past seventy-five years, primarily because
a standing committee of union and management representatives meets every two weeks
to discuss grievances or common prob-

lems. 1"
But enthusiasm for the "continuing contact" approach is not restricted to union
leaders. A study entitled The Causes of
Industrial Peace by the National Planning
Association has concluded that in every
successful collective bargaining relationship
studied, this practice (of periodic labormanagement conferences) was a main,
contributing factor. 3 Professor John T.
Dunlop, of Harvard, has recommended that
the current bargaining situation in steel
should set a pattern for other industries to
follow; in Professor Dunlop's opinion, none
of the complex issues confronting labormanagement relations today can be resolved
satisfactorily "under the gun of a negotiat14
ing deadline.'
It is also noteworthy, on this score, that
an important element in the maintenance of
industrial peace in Great Britain has been
the establishment of joint industry councils
in most sectors at the top level and, in some
cases, regionally.', David L. Cole, a former
director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and a prominent arbitrator, recently praised another European
nation, Sweden, for evolving a harmonious,
fruitful, and yet inviolate, system of collective bargaining. Government participation
in Swedish labor-management relations is
restricted to periodic tripartite discussions
of such matters as the impact of automation,
cyclical stabilism and related items affecting
the economy as a whole. Sweden has no
emergency dispute legislation because such

9 Id. at 151.

REL. REP. 65 (Jan. 21, 1963).

164 (Feb. 11, 1963).

1"See Lester, Reflections on Collective Bargaining
in Britain and Sweden, 10 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
375-80 (1957).

10 Id.at 144.
" Speech by W. Willard Wirtz, 52 LAB. REL. REP.

121d. at 186.
'3

Ibid.

14 Speech by Professor John T. Dunlop, 52 LAB.
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emergencies have yet to occur in that country. Mr. Cole also singled out the labor plan
established between the Hart, Schaffner and
Marx Company and the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America as a form of
labor-management cooperation which has
served as a model for the American clothing
industry. Hart, Schaffner and Marx has had
no strikes for almost fifty years. 16
Amending Taft-Hartley
While emphasizing the voluntary approach, the President's Committee nevertheless acknowledged that extraordinary
measures might be necessary in cases of
major disputes involving whole or important segments of critical industries and proceeded to recommend, in several respects,
revision of the current emergency dispute
legislation.
Instead of a Board of Inquiry the President would have authority, in his discretion,
to appoint an Emergency Dispute Board at
any stage of the crucial negotiations upon
the recommendation of the Director of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
In addition to conducting a hearing on the
question whether the dispute threatens the
national health and safety, the President
would be empowered to direct the board to
mediate the dispute, to work closely with
the federal mediators and to propose recommendations for settling the dispute.
On the basis of the board's report, the
President would have final authority (subject, of course, to judicial review) to determine if such a threat exists and, if so, to
declare a national emergency. The President
then might direct the Attorney General to
procure a court order enjoining the strike
16 Lecture by David L. Cole originally delivered at
Harvard University, American Federationist, Feb.,
1963, p. 7.

or lockout in whole, or "to the extent practicable," in part, but in no event for longer
than eighty days.
In addition, during the emergency period
the board would be permitted, in the discretion of the Chief Executive, to announce
publicly its findings of fact and proposed
settlement recommendations, and also to
recommend to the parties terms or conditions of employment which should be put
into effect during the injunction period on a
17
concurrent or retroactive basis.
The President's Committee also concurred in the widely-held view that the lastoffer ballot procedure has proved to be ineffective, and perhaps harmful to serious
negotiations, and should be eliminated.' 8
The Committee correctly noted that its
formula is mild in comparison with other
proposed solutions for the emergency dispute problem. The more extreme among
these have included: (1) a plan for submitting to the electorate in a national poll
the decision as to whether a national emergency strike should be permitted to resume
after the injunction period' 9 and, (2) the
delegation to an administrative agency, such
Messrs. Meaney, Dubinsky, Harrison, Keenan,
McDonald and Reuther demurred at this point on
17

the grounds that such recommendations would be
"ineffective and illogical." They suggested instead

that the President should be accorded the power to
compel the institution during the injunction period
of whatever terms and conditions of employment
he deems to be equitable.
18 See Givens, Dealing with Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 17, 32 (1960); Pierson, An
Evaluation of the NationalEmergency Provisions,
EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY, 145
(1955); Rehmus, The Operation of the National
Emergency Provisions, 62 YALE L.J. 1047 (1952).
19 Rothenberg, National Emergency Dispute: A
Proposed Solution, 65 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1960); see
also, Givens, Professor Rothenberg's Proposed
Solution for National Emergency Disputes: A
Reply, 65 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1961).
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as the NLRB, the authority, inter alia, "to
determine appropriate bargaining units to
avoid exercise of monopolistic power by
unions" and to determine when strike votes
20
should be called.
The President's Committee nevertheless
regretted that further intrusions by the
government into the collective bargaining
process need be made at all. The Committee did not recommend any measures for
protecting the public interest if the strike
(or lockout) resumes after the "cooling-off"
period, beyond repeating the current provision in Taft-Hartley for a report to the
congress by the President with "such recommendations as he may see fit to make for
consideration and appropriate action." 2 1
Mild though they are, the Committee's
proposals, if enacted into legislation, will
answer much of the criticism of the current
statute and might well satisfy the country's
needs for many years to come. To begin
with, there is some question as to how often
a labor dispute actually imperils the national
health or safety. It is true that Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy all have
indicated no great reluctance to invoke
their emergency dispute powers; but the
statute, though permissive, confronts the
President with the hard choice of either
seeking an eighty-day injunction or doing
virtually nothing in the face of a disruption
in production which might conceivably endanger, even slightly, this country's position
in the international "cold war."
It is also true that while the judiciary has
guarded the right of the district courts under
section 208 of the Act to make their own
determinations as to whether the national
20 Cooper, Protecting the Public Interest in Labor
Disputes, 58 MICIL L. REv. 873, 883 (1960).
21

Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley

Act), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §176 (1958).

health or safety is imperiled by the stoppage, the courts, apparently in every case,22
have acceded to the President's requests.
The courts in making such determinations
may be influenced by the same balancing of
interests which motivate the President; but
another factor is the decision by the United
States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers
of America v. United States that there is "no
room in the statute" for less than a blanket
injunction. 23 In a sense, the statute interferes
with the traditional equity powers of the
federal courts 24 and calls upon the courts to
"rubber stamp" the executive determina25

tions.
On the other hand, considering the enormous size of this country, a valid argument
can be made that no labor dispute to date
has endangered, or forseeably could en26
danger, the national health or safety.
There is, moreover, the serious question
of what criteria should be utilized to determine that such an emergency exists; the
non-economic effects of a major stoppage,
e.g., nationwide revulsion for collective bargaining might be just as harmful as the
2 7
economic impact.
See United States v. United Steelworkers of
America, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1953) where the
court granted an injunction at the behest of President Truman restraining a strike at a single plant
of the American Locomotive Company.
23 361 U.S. 39, 43 (1959).
24 Id. at 70 (dissenting opinion).
2

25 See Comment, Injunction of Strikes Affecting
National Health and Safety, 62 W. VA. L. REv.
284 (1959).
26 See Goldberg & Barbash, Labor Looks at the
National Emergency Provisions,EMERGENCY DIsPUTEs AND NATIONAL POLICY, 117 (1955); Heron,
Industry Looks at the National Emergency Provisions, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY, 128 (1955).
27 Wirtz, The Choice of ProceduresApproach to
National Emergency Disputes, EMERGENCY DisPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY, 163 (1955); Hildebrand, An Economic Definition, EMERGENCY
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In any event, many spokesmen for labor
and management (including the members of
the President's Advisory Committee) are in
agreement that emergency disputes provisions, of any kind, should be used sparingly. 28 The late Senator Robert A. Taft,
who was the sole author of the emergency
dispute provisions, 29 said during the 1947
legislative debates that the contemplated
peril to the national health or safety was
"a condition which, it is anticipated, will
"30
not often occur.
But assuming that the history of presidential intervention under sections 206-21.0 has
been fully justified, an analysis of the proposals of the Advisory Committee reveals
much more substance than is apparent at
first glance. In general, a wider choice of
procedures would be made available to the
President. Professor (now Solicitor General
of the United States) Archibald Cox has
said that the chief advantage of the flexible
approach to settling emergency disputes
"lies in the capacity for preserving uncertainty as to the form and extent of government intervention."', It is almost axiomatic
that collective bargaining becomes aimless
if the negotiators are aware that at a certain
point in the dispute settlement terms will be
dictated by an outside party.
For this reason, and also because compulsory arbitration in the few states that
have enacted such legislation has not proved
6 (1955).
See Givens, Dealing with Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 17, 36 (1960); Heron, op. cit
supra note 26, at 128.
29 See Kleiler, A Legislative History of the National Emergency Provision, EMERGENCY DisPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY, 107 (1955).
30 93 CONG. REC. 6860 (1947) (remarks by Senator
Taft).
31 Cox, Strikes and the Public Interest, Atlantic
Monthly, Feb. 1960, pp. 48-51.
DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY,
28

noticeably successful in maintaining industrial peace, such proposals have received
few endorsements. 32 Related to compulsory
arbitration and subject to the same objections is the recent proposal by Mr. Bernard
Baruch for a court of labor-management
relations to decide disputes still unresolved
after the "cooling-off" period.3 3 Labor-management conflicts, unlike ordinary litigation,
do not lend themselves easily to judicial
34
determination.
Perhaps the most important feature of the
Committee's substantive proposals would
permit the President to seek an injunction
for a period of time less than eighty days
and, if practicable, on a limited basis. Presumably, emergency dispute situations may
arise where the parties, in cooperation with
the government, will be able and willing to
devise a formula for resumption of only
critical operations in order to avoid a
blanket injunction (the union) and, to procure some injunctive relief (the employer(s)).
To the extent that this appraoch is utilized the emphasis in the legislation will be
placed solely on the need to protect the
public. The rigid construction of sections
206-210, as presently written, for all practical purposes gives an overwhelming advantage to management in the economic
test of strength by depriving the union,
albeit for a limited period of time, of its
only potent weapon, the right to strike.
In the same vein, the proposed revisions
of the statute permitting the presidential
board actively to intervene before, during
and after the injunction period will affirm
But see speech by A. H. Raskin, 52 LAB. REL.
REP. 65 (Jan. 21, 1963); Speech by Paul L. Styler,
51 LAB. REL. REP. 208 (Oct. 25, 1962).
33 See speech by W. W. Wirtz, 52 LAB. REL. REP.
164 (Feb. 11, 1963).
34See Cooper, Protecting the Public Interest in
Labor Disputes, 58 MICH. L. REv. 873, 878 (1960).
32
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the dispute aspect of the emergency as opposed to the present implication that an
offense has been committed by the union
against the national interest. The new approach would also endorse the theory that
the public weal should be served by attempting to remove the underlying causes of the
emergency stoppage as well as by terminating the stoppage itself.
Likewise, the announcement by the board
of the facts of the dispute, especially when
the negotiations are deadlocked, will satisfy
the right of the public to be informed and,
as a consequence, will also generate a certain amount of pressure on the more obdurate of the parties. For various reasons,
labor-management negotiators, as a rule, are
mutually reluctant to permit full press coverage of the negotiations, so that the public
generally must rely for some knowledge of
the crucial facts upon partisan advertisements in the daily press and in magazines.
There will be situations, of course, as the
Advisory Committee apparently realized
(for example, a settlement may be imminent) where the President, in his discretion,
may decide that such disclosure of the facts
would not be in the public interest.
The proposed amendment to the statute
which will permit the President to authorize
the board, if he deems such action to be
desirable, to make non-binding recommendations is itself quite substantial. Experience has shown that the probability that
such recommendations will be forthcoming
in the event of a bargaining impasse tends
to hasten settlement to (1) protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and,
(2) preserve the reputations of the negotiators as negotiators. On the other hand, thirdparty recommendations sometimes enable
both sides to emerge from a hopeless deadlock without losing face. This may have

been a vital factor in the acceptance of
Mayor Robert F. Wagner's recommendations by the representatives of the printers
and the publishers prior to the termination
of the lengthy New York publishers' strikelockout.
Such recommendations need not be restricted to unimaginative compromises of
opposing positions. They may take the form
of so-called "mediators' proposals" which
constitute a calculated guess as to what the
parties would agree to, ultimately and respectively, at the point of economic exhaustion.35 Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz
has said that if the Taft-Hartley Board,
appointed by President Kennedy during the
recent dock dispute, had had the power to
make recommendations, the walkout which
followed the expiration of the injunction
might have been prevented. 36
The power of a presidential board to
make recommendations has existed with
generally good results in the field of atomic
energy since 1948. 37 In that year, President
Truman created the Atomic-Energy LaborManagement Relations Panel to which the
Atomic Energy Commission delegated its
jurisdiction over labor-management relations. The Panel, like the Missile Sites Labor
Commission, established by President Kennedy on May 26, 1961, operates in a field
where the government has a cost interest in
collective bargaining between contractors
and their employees, and also a vital interest
in uninterrupted operations." Consequently,

See Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 28, 1963,
p. 1.
88

36 Speech by W. W. Wirtz, 52 LAB. REL. REP. 52

(Jan. 14, 1963).
37 See Givens, Dealing with Emergency Labor Disputes, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 17, 32 (1960).
88 Johnson, Dispute Settlement in Atomic Energy
Plants, 13 IND. & LAB. RFL. REV. 38 (1959).
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the Panel and the Missile Sites Labor Commission enjoy much broader powers, short
of compelling arbitration, than those contemplated by the Advisory Committee report
with which we are concerned here.
Since the Emergency Dispute Board, unlike the Panel and the Missile Sites Labor
Commission would be an ad hoc group with
a new complement of members, perhaps for
each dispute, it is tempting to conclude that
an existing agency such as the NLRB might
be a more satisfactory alternative. 39 The
NLRB personnel, so the argument goes,
would be able to anticipate and work to
resolve emergency disputes in the embryonic
stage. On balance, however, such an alternative should be repected both on the merits
and as politically inexpedient. A board composed of distinguished neutrals who are
expert in the problems of a particular industry presumably can be more objective in
their approach, and thus more persuasive
than full-time government employees.
Furthermore, though criticism of the
Atomic Energy Panel, for the most part, has
been favorable, 40 there is some evidence of
reliance by the parties to an undetermined
extent in their negotiations upon government intervention.41 This weakness, if it
does exist, may be justified for atomic energy
operations (and missile sites) since it is
still the position of the Atomic Energy Commission that labor-management relations in
that field must be accorded special treatment, 42 but it might prove intolerable in
other industries.

The proposals of the President's Advisory
Committee admittedly fall far short of providing the President with an "arsenal of
weapons" like that which is available to the
Governor of Massachusetts.4 3 The disadvantages of compulsory arbitration have already
been noted. Plant seizure as a method of
settling emergency disputes would seem to
be a drastic alternative but, surprisingly,
this approach if used in conjunction with
other measures so as to preserve the element of uncertainty, has received a fair
4
amount of support in responsible circles.

39 See Cooper, supra note 34, at 883.
40 See Crawford, Government Intervention in
Emergency Disputes in Atomic Energy, 10 LAB.

that endanger "the public health and safety."
44 See Givens, supra note 37, at 27; Cox, Seizure
in Emergency Disputes, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND

L.J. 414 (1959); Johnson, supra note 38, at 51.
But cf. Browne, The Missile Sites Labor Commission and the Derogation of the Taft-Hartley Act,

NATIONAL POLicy, 242 (1955); Proposal by Senator Jacob Javits, 52 LAB. REL. REP. 91 (Jan. 28,
1963) (advocating a limited form of seizure).

48 A.B.A.J. 121 (1962).

45 Fleming, The Search for a Formula, EMER-

41 Johnson, supra note 38, at 39.

GENCY DISPUTES AND
(1955).

42 Ibid.

It is true that seizure of the struck plants by
the government during the injunction period, while perhaps unnecessary for the
protection of the public interest, certainly
would announce dramatically that the objective of the act is not to punish one party
and to aid the other. Seizure in some cases
might result, however, in an undue advantage to the union.
In addition, there is the enormous administrative difficulty of effectuating the seizure
and the insurmountable difficulty of persuading the congress to accord such power
to the President in futuro. The mutual confidence required for such legislation rarely
has existed between the legislative and the
executive branches of the government in
this century. 45 Admittedly, congress consti43 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 150B, §§1-7 (1957). The

Massachusetts statute, popularly known as the
Slichter Law after the late Prof. Sumner Slichter
who was instrumental in its enactment, provides
for a wide assortment of measures including compulsory arbitration and seizure for certain disputes

NATIONAL

POLICY,

221
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tutionally could delegate such power to the
President.4 6
The political obstacles would also defeat
the minor form of seizure, i.e., compulsory
imposition of terms and conditions of employment during the emergency period, recommended by the labor representatives on
the President's Advisory Committee. But,
in the last analysis, seizure, compulsory
arbitration or related measures, or legislation remedying the underlying causes of the
particular dispute, can be made available to
the President on an ad hoc basis as the need
4 7

arises.

The moderate proposals advanced by the
President's Advisory Committee will have
the two-fold advantage of procuring some
reform of the existing legislation without
endangering the collective bargaining process. Except for the limited exceptions by the
labor representatives noted above, only one
member of the twenty-one member Advisory Committee, Henry Ford, II, dissented
from the Committee's report. 48 This near

unanimity is not without significance from
4GYoungstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

U.S. 579 (1952).
47 Recently President Kennedy signed into law a
joint resolution of the congress which had the
immediate effect of averting a nation-wide rail
strike. The resolution, the first of its kind, provides
for compulsory arbitration of the two major bargaining issues, the mechanics of which are expected
to consume 180 days commencing August 28. At
the end of that period either party will be permitted to resort to "self help," i.e., strikes or lockouts, in the unlikely event that the secondary
issues have not been resolved through the bargaining process 54 LAB. REL. REt'. 3 (Sept. 2, 1963)
(The railroads are not subject to the provisions of
the Labor Management Relations Act and the
"emergency" aspects of a labor stoppage in that
industry, though not unrelated, obviously present
problems far more acute than those with which we
are concerned here.)
48 Mr. Ford agreed, however, that the "last-offer"
ballot procedure should be eliminated.

the political standpoint.
Federal Pre-Emption
There can be no question that a labor
dispute might constitute a local calamity
and at the same time adversely affect the
national interest without falling within the
purview of sections 206-210. For example,
it has been estimated that the recent work
stoppage among the New York newspapers
cost the city's economy more than $100,000,000. 49 The strike-lockout "had a vital

effect on the economic life of this great city
of New York."50 In addition, among the
thousands of far-reaching effects of the
"brownout" (several interim newspapers
did appear on the stands) was the ability of
the city government to pass quietly into law
some highly controversial measures. 5
However, according to Secretary of Labor
Wirtz5 2 and President Kennedy 5 3 the news-

paper situation could not be considered a
national emergency dispute in the light of
past practice, the legislative history of TaftHartley and the language of the statute itself.
Several states, among them Massachusetts, have attempted to fill the vacuum, in
part, with legislation aimed at curbing local
emergencies. The constitutionality of such
legislation, however, has been somewhat
doubtful since a 1951 decision by the United
States Supreme Court striking down a Wisconsin statute which substituted compulsory
arbitration for strikes, both violent and
peaceful, by utility workers. 54 In the Wis49
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50 Remarks by President Kennedy, 52 LAB. REL.

REP. 231 (March 4, 1963).
51 Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1963, p. 7.
52 52 LAB. REL. REP. 52 (Jan. 14, 1963).
53 Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1963, p. 1.
5,Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Electric Ry. &Motor
Coach Employees of America v. Wisconsin Employment Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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consin case the Court cited Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB 55 for the proposition
that federal labor legislation encompasses
all industries affecting interstate commerce
and thus pre-empts concurrent state regulation.
Since its enactment in 1947, the Slichter
Law has been invoked in less than ten disputes but the mere existence of the law and
the threat that it represents has been a contributing factor to settlements in many other
negotiations in Massachusetts. Aside from
the question of its constitutionality, the
Slichter Law can be criticized on several
other grounds, most of which become academic if the need to invoke its procedures
seldom arises. On the whole, comment has
been favorable.56 Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the integrity of the collective
bargaining process has suffered as a result
and the fact remains that since 1947 the
health and safety of no community in Massachusetts has been imperiled during a labor
dispute.
Conclusion
No adequate discussion of measures for
settling labor disputes in industries affected
with a national interest can ignore the underlying causes of such disputes. Few
authorities on labor-management relations
today will deny that the emergency dispute
55 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
56 See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela-

tions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); Fleming, The
Search for a Formula, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND
NATIONAL POLICY, 221 (1955); Wirtz, The Choice
of Procedures Approach to National Emergency
Disputes, EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL
POLICY, 163, 165 (1955); Comment, Injunction of
Strikes Affecting National Health and Safety, 62
W. VA. L. REV. 284, 289 (1959); see Shultz, The
Massachusetts Choice-of-Procedures Approach to
Emergency Disputes, 10 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
359 (1957).

provisions of the NLRB have proved to be
ineffective, for the most part, and perhaps
harmful in maintaining industrial peace.
But, more important, a fair number of management and neutral spokesmen seem to
concur in the view that the 1947 amendments have failed, not because congress
omitted procedures for the post "coolingoff" period, but because congress, during a
period of industrial turmoil that was not
conducive to objectivity in approach, enacted legislation that was, in fact, punitive
and one-sided.
While it would be futile to attempt to
overlook partisan considerations in this
area, the report of the President's Advisory
Committee shows that partisan interests and
the public welfare can be accommodated by
reasonable men. The bulk of the language in
the report concentrates on the dispute aspect
of national emergencies and suggests voluntary procedures designed to avert, or at
least reduce, the gravity of industrial disputes before they reach the crucial stage.
Adoption of the extraordinary measures
proposed by the President's Committee also
will preserve the vitality of the collective
bargaining process by providing the President with a flexible choice of procedures
which focus on persuasion or the generation
of the pressure of public opinion, rather
than on direct compulsion, as methods of
resolving emergency disputes. At the same
time, the new powers to be accorded to the
President for delegation to an Emergency
Dispute Board will affirm the right of the
public to be represented continuously in
major negotiations after a crisis arises.
The President's Committee did not discuss the question of pre-emption but its
reservation of the proposed extraordinary
measures to "major disputes involving whole
or important segments of critical industries"

9
should encourage legislation according some
emergency dispute powers to the states.
The Massachusetts approach to such problems, though extreme in some respects,
incorporates to a remarkable degree the element of flexibility that most critics agree is
basic to emergency dispute legislation. It
might furnish a satisfactory model for other
states to follow if permitted by the congress
to do so. But the resolution of work stoppages that affect the public health and safety
or which have more subtle but no less tragic
effects, like the New York newspaper stoppage, is a problem for the states to decide,
each in its own way.
Finally, the need for more drastic federal
legislation in this area, even on an ad hoc
basis, might never be necessary if the
"increased measure of maturity" called for
by the President's Advisory Committee becomes a reality in our system of collective
bargaining. The American economy, to this
day, anticipates and accepts a certain
amount of industrial conflict as part of the
price to be paid for the maintenance of distinct and separate spheres of influence in
employment relationships.5 7 While statistics
do show that the incidence of strikes in this
country has declined in recent years and
presumably will continue to decline, the
strike weapon will not "wither away." Resort
to economic strength is still an important
feature of the industrial relations systems of
the United States and Canada. This is not
so in most other non-totalitarian nations
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around the world, especially in Western
Europe.5 1
According to Pope Pius XI, "this accumulation of power, the characteristic note
of the modern economic order, is a natural
result of limitless free competition which
permits the survival of those only who are
the strongest, which often means those who
fight most relentlessly, who pay least heed
to the dictates of conscience.. .. ,,59 Though
the Pope was concerned primarily with the
exploitation of the working classes by the
captains of industry, his strictures would
seem to have relevance also to those situations when labor possesses the economic
leverage.
Arbitrator David L. Cole has described
collective bargaining in the United States as
"still primitive and crude in many instances." 60 Cole urged greater acceptance of
labor-management cooperation during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement.6 1
The growing complexities of our industrial life and the instabilities of international
relations were cited by the President's Advisory Committee as justification not only
for more government intervention but, primarily, for greater rapport between the two
partisan sectors of our economy. According
to Professors Hartman and Ross, both
(Continued on page 319)

58 Ross & HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 16881.
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and on free collective bargaining.. . we recognize
that right (to strike upon contract expiration) in
spite of the inconvenience and in some cases, danger, to the people of the United States which may
result from the exercise of such right...." 93 CONG.
REC. 3835-36 (1947) (remarks by Senator Taft).
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"Collective bargaining, of its very nature, impels
both parties to look more or less exclusively to
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Department of Social Action of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 72 Commonweal, Sept.
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